Motivation - the Heart of the Matter
by Roger Hild |
Motivation. The reason why: the reason why not. Anyone whose goal is to
cause, influence or change their dog's behavior will have greater success
once they begin to understand and work with the animal's
motivation.
Such an important concept has more than its share of disagreements
amongst "the experts." This becomes very clear when one takes a
closer look at the ongoing debates over topics such as learning theory or
which dog training methods yield the best results. In simply trying to
address and change their dog's behaviour, the average dog owner risks
getting caught in the crossfire from those deeply divided on the
subject.
So, let's begin this exercise with a "why question." Why did
the chicken cross the road? The standard answer to this cute little riddle
is, "To get to the other side." Ask a group of learned
behaviorists the same question and they are likely to expound on the
chicken's reinforcement history coupled with a series of approximations and
tied to various motivators. I like to imagine asking the chickens the same
question: they'd probably tell you they do it for the amusement they garner
from keeping the behaviorists occupied.
Behaviourists, despite any claims to the contrary, are not the only
experts on behaviour. They are, in fact, only representative of one narrow
view of behaviour. There are many non-behaviourist experts that understand
explain and work with behaviour. Behaviourists are reductionist; interested
only in breaking observable behaviour into tiny segments and using S-R
(stimulus - response) theory to explain their observations.
The behaviorist J. B. Watson said, "The rule, or measuring rod,
which the behaviorist puts in front of him always is: Can I describe this
bit of behavior I see in terms of `stimulus and response'?"
According to the behaviorist view of the world, we are all nothing more than
organic matter interacting with the various stimuli in our
environment.
Skinner, one of the most influential behaviourists and considered the
father of "Operant Coditioning," said in "About
Behaviorism," 1974, p. 213):
"A person is first of all an organism, a member of a species and a
subspecies, possessing a genetic endowment of anatomical and physiological
characteristics, which are the product of the contingencies of survival to
which the species has been exposed in the process of evolution. The organism
becomes a person [i.e., a unique individual] as it acquires a repertoire of
behavior under the contingencies of reinforcement to which it is exposed in
its lifetime. The behavior it exhibits at any moment is under the control of
a current setting. It is able to acquire such a repertoire because of
processes of conditioning, to which it is susceptible because of its genetic
endowment."
On pg.15 of "Excel-erated Learning" Pamela J. Reid
wrote:
"The acceptance of behaviorism went hand in hand with the rejection
of the study of the mind. B. F. Skinner believed that we could understand
behavior by studying the things that happen to animals. There was no
need to study what was happening inside the animal's head. Understanding the
laws of behavior and how events affect an animal's behavior do not
necessitate understanding the mind. In fact Skinner's form of "radical
behaviorism" even rejected the notion that thoughts, feelings, and
emotions could cause behavior."
But is this truly the case? Are we and our dogs nothing more than organic
matter that only behaves in response to various environmental stimuli?
Thankfully not. Many in the scientific and academic world have begun to
discredit and discard many of the tenants underlying the behaviorists
conditioning theory. More of a focus is now being directed toward
understanding internal motivations, cognitive processes, individual choice
and purposeful action. One could say that while all conditioning is
learning, not all learning is conditioning. Indeed, conditioning makes up
only a fraction of learning.
In fact, Koestler wrote this about reductionism:
"Yet throughout the dark ages of psychology most of the work done in
the laboratories consisted of analyzing bricks and mortar in the hope that
by patient effort somehow one day it would tell you what a cathedral looked
like." Arthur Koestler, "The Ghost in the Machine." NY:
Random House (1967), p. 9.
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, said:
"Let us face the fact: a large part of modern psychology is a
sterile and pompous scholasticism which, with the blinders of preconceived
notions or superstitions on its nose, doesn't see the obvious; which covers
the triviality of its results and ideas with a preposterous language bearing
no resemblance either to normal English or normal scientific theory; and
which provides modern society with the techniques for the progressive
stultification of mankind." "Robots, Men and Minds."
NY: George Braziller (1967), p. 6
On p. 10 (same reference) Bertalanffy said:
"The S-R scheme discards a large part of behavior which is an
expression of autonomous activity: play, exploratory behavior, any form of
creativity." People had been training dogs for thousands of years
prior to the mindless slide into `Skinners World,' the world of operant
conditioning. Some trainers were effective and some not, some were
"humane" and some not - much as is the case today. The fact that
dogs (like the rest of us) learn from their experiences and that pleasure
and pain plays a role in that learning, is probably as old as awareness
itself. Operant conditioning, as a teaching tool, does not give the
practitioner anything new. It's evolution as a theory grew out of attempts
to explain why us `organic types' behave as we do. In that sense then,
operant conditioning is a theory of motivation and while it may be partially
correct, it is a seriously flawed theory.
I watch a four-week-old puppy attempt to climb out of the whelping box
for the first time. Every unsuccessful attempt is met with renewed
determination. Why? The puppy's repeated attempts seem to violate the very
conditioning theory that behaviorists hold sacred. This puppy seems to
hold at least one quality in common with the likes of folks like Thomas
Edison, persistence. Like the pioneer and the inventor, their motto is,
"If at first you don't succeed, try, try again." The greatest
accomplishments, it seems, come from those with the determination to fail
their way to success.
Skinner promoted the concept that organisms react and behave simply
because of external factors. He said thought and awareness are nothing more
than annoying, meaningless by-products. The result of this is that the
concepts of consciousness, awareness, self-control, will, self-determinism
and personal responsibility cannot and do not exist within the
behaviourist's ideological frameworks. They consider such concepts as minor
and of no meaningful significance. They hold the view that at best all
internal subjective states, including feelings, are nothing more than
chemical reactions in the brain or stimulus-response reactions to
evolutionary and immediate environmental forces.
Skinner didn't believe in the inner world of the mind or that behaviour
could be internally driven by thoughts, feelings, free will and conscious
choice. Because he didn't believe in these factors, he had no place for them
in his theory. Because his theory itself is flawed, what has since flowed
from his theory has been both inconsistent and unreliable.
Here is what Arthur Koestler has to say in "The Ghost in the
Machine." NY: Random House (1967), p. 17:
"Historically, Behaviorism started as a reaction against the
excesses of introspective techniques....At first its intention was merely to
exclude consciousness, images and other non-public phenomena as objects of
study from the field of psychology; but later on this came to imply that the
excluded phenomena did not exist. A programme for a methodology, which had
its arguable points, became transformed into a philosophy which had no point
at all."
He also wrote:
"Behaviorism is indeed a kind of flat-earth view of the mind."
Ibid., p. 17.
And on p. 18 he wrote:
"The record of fifty years of rattomorphic psychology is comparable
in its sterile pedantry to that of scholasticism in its period of decline,
when it had fallen to counting angels on pin-heads --although this sounds a
more attractive pastime than counting the number of bar-pressings on the
box."
It is interesting to note that when behaviourism (specifically operant
conditioning) fails to produce reliable responses - when the actual mind of
the dog is never truly engaged, the result is often an increase in
undesirable behaviours which can include aggression. Instead of
addressing the holes in their training model as the root cause of the
problem, the behaviorist then employs the strategy of, "blame the
subject." This is often disguised by an attempt to affix a behavioural
diagnosis and along with this fancy label, advise complete environmental
control, employ even more conditioning strategies and if that fails suggest
drugs and then death. They will not seek to engage the dog's mind in the
training process - it's hard to engage that what you don't acknowledge.
What is actually at issue is one's belief about motivation. To the
behaviorist, motivation is an external stimulus. There are many others
however (myself included) who view motivation more as an internal event.
Behaviour, especially non-reflexive behaviour, is more often a choice rather
than simply a conditioned response to an eliciting stimulus. The stimulus
is, in fact, quite peripheral to the behaviour which, after all, has its
origins in the mind.
Alfie Kohn says:
"Few readers will be shocked by the news that extrinsic motivators
are a poor substitute for genuine interest in what one is doing. What is
likely to be far more surprising and disturbing is the further point that
rewards, like punishments, actually undermine the intrinsic motivation that
promotes optimal performance...."
Alfie Kohn, "Punished By Rewards." NY: Houghton Mifflin (1993),
p. 68.
"The first explanation (of why rewards undermine motivation) has an
appealing simplicity to it and seems to make sense on the basis of our
real-life experience: anything presented as a prerequisite for something
else -- that is, as a means toward some other end -- comes to be seen as
less desirable. `Do this and you'll get that' automatically devalues the
`this'." Alfie Kohn, Ibid., p. 76.
In correspondence on the subject of why animals behave, Dorothy C.
Dunning Ph. D wrote (and I am quoting her with permission): "My major
professor, Ken Roeder, was a neurophysiologist interested in insect
behavior. He addressed Roger's plaint in another way.
A little terminology, to make the following comprehensible: Sensory
inputs are the way stimuli get into the nervous system; motor outputs are
the way behavior happens. In between is the central nervous system or brain,
which links and controls input and output. Usually the behavior is a
consequence of the contractions of a bunch of muscles, in a carefully
orchestrated sort of way. Muscles are controlled by nerve cells called
motoneurons.
When fooling around in the nervous system of an insect, he could reliably
get a muscle twitch (or sometimes several) by stimulating the motoneuron
that ran to that muscle, but when he backed off, further upstream in the
neural pathways that controlled behavior, the less predictable the behavior
became. Even in an insect, and even in one whose behavior and nervous system
were simple, he could not predict exactly what the animal would do.
So he built a mechanical model of the insect he was studying at the time,
a cockroach. He endowed this machine with sensory inputs qualitatively like
those of a roach, and with motor outputs controlled by those inputs in a way
similar to the way roaches responded to sensory inputs. Even though he had
built this "beast," he could not control its behavior as precisely
as he had expected. It got into behavioral cul de sacs he had not predicted
and had mechanical "nervous breakdowns." So he built a "time
out" circuit into its "brain," an incandescent lightbulb that
lit when the machine could not decide what to do. That was the signal for us
to come watch or, if the lightbulb burnt out, to replace the thing and
rescue the roach.
Roeder called this unpredictability the "evitability" of
behavior, for no response was inevitable, even given complete control over
it. Roeder was one of the first ethologists, those who explain
behavior in terms of its adaptive significance for the animal doing the
behaving, rather than in terms of stimuli and environmental control.
He was the first neuroethologist, the first to recognize the significance of
the fact that many neurons are not all-or-none devices, that even the
responses of individual nerve cells cannot be precisely predicted, let alone
the constellations of behavior they control.
If cockroach behavior is evitable, that of more complex animals like dogs
and people is even more so.
Watson and Skinner were guilty of hubris."
Victims of Circumstance?
It seems that for every unacceptable behaviour engaged in by either man
or beast, there is an excuse. Is the dog that bites his way through limits
simply acting as he must in accordance with his reinforcement history? How
about the thief, the fighter or the rapist, are they, like the dog that
bites, simply acting according to their reinforcement history? Are we all
simply displaying the results of the reinforcement schedules to which we've
been subjected and therefore victims of our conditioning?
Widespread acceptance of conditioning theory during its heyday has led to
a plethora of problems we, as a society, are still struggling to come to
grips with. In addition to a decline in positive results in our classrooms,
we have witnessed a shift away from holding individuals accountable for
their behaviour. This should come as no surprise. The concepts of
consciousness, awareness, self-control, will, self-determinism and personal
responsibility cannot and do not exist within the behaviourist's ideological
frameworks - particularly those influenced by Skinner.
When we attempt to bring criminals to justice, lawyers, tearing a page
from the behaviourist textbook, will argue, "he's not
responsible." The excuses run from, "a history of
deprivation" to "a history of excesses." In most cases it
will be the mother, father, teacher, neighbour or just society in general
that the lawyer will try to put on trial to take the responsibility for
their clients actions. The poor bugger had no choice but to steal, rape or
murder - after all, his reinforcement history you know. Does the same
dynamic apply to the unacceptable behaviour of dogs? I believe it does. In
the opening of this article I referenced the riddle, "Why did the
chicken cross the road?" In that question, one could substitute dog for
chicken and instead of, "cross the road," substitute any behaviour. Why did the dog bite the mailman? Why did the dog ignore me when
I called him? In all cases the behaviourist will not hold the dog
responsible but will hold it's conditioning or lack of conditioning solely
responsible. According to behaviourist dogma, dogs don't make decisions;
they are never contentious and they cannot be held accountable, they only
respond according to their conditioning. Behaviourists, like lawyers hold
that circumstances, not individuals, are responsible.
There is no question that we all learn from our past experiences, our
history. That one factor alone, however, cannot account for more than a
fraction of the behaviour we see daily. We all, dogs included, are able to
act outside the influence of our history. We are able to adapt and we can
act counter to any conditioning, rise above it and behave differently.
Anthropomorphism the Final Taboo
Anthropomorphism is defined as the attribution of human form or qualities
to that which is not human. Behaviourists hate anthropomorphism and
for the most part have succeeded in making it something horrible, something
to be avoided at all costs. For a professional working with animals, being labeled
as anthropomorphic is akin to a government official being labeled as racist.
Most often it is the motivation being attributed to a particular
behaviour that gets labeled as anthropomorphic. Examples might be: "My
dog bit me because he was jealous of my new kitten."
Granted, once one starts to attribute human foibles or any motive, they
run the risk of being wrong. It is also possible to become totally
ineffective because one's assumptions are so far off base. I would
point out however, I've made similar mistakes in trying to understand
something my wife has done. Sometimes despite the best of intentions, it is
possible to misinterpret.
It seems to me that viewing things in human terms is a perfectly normal
thing for a human to do. The more experienced and knowledgeable we are about
the subject, the more our hypothesis might be correct.
I do find it curious that among some who call themselves
behaviourists,
we find those who readily anthropomorphize when it suits their purpose to do
so. Anyone ever wonder what is behind behaviourist terms such as, "Fear
aggression" or "Separation anxiety?"
In was recently doing a little research into the subject of
anthropomorphism because I was curious about the taboos surrounding it. It
came as quite a surprise for me to learn of the religious origin and
meaning.
The Microsoft® Encarta® 97 Encyclopedia. © 1993-1996 Microsoft
Corporation. All rights reserved, states:
"In the history of religion, anthropomorphism refers to the
depiction of God in a human image, with human bodily form and emotions, such
as jealousy, wrath, or love. Whereas mythology is exclusively concerned with
anthropomorphic gods, other religious thought holds that it is inappropriate
to regard an omnipotent, omnipresent God as human. In order to speak of God,
however, metaphorical language must be employed. In philosophy and theology,
seemingly anthropomorphic concepts and language are used because it is
impossible to think of God without attributing to him some human
traits..."
"Nineteenth-century German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel held that
Greek anthropomorphic religion represented an improvement over the worship
of gods in the shape of animals, a practice called theriomorphism (Greek
therion, "animal"; morphe, "shape"). Hegel also
maintained that Christianity brought the notion of anthropomorphism to
maturity by insisting not only that God assumed a human form, but also that
Jesus Christ was both a fully human person as well as fully divine.
Because Christianity incorporates humanity into the very nature of divinity,
it has been accused of anthropomorphism by both Jewish and Islamic
thinkers."
So how did anthropomorphism become a problem for the behaviorist? I found
the following web article that was quite interesting and makes a connection
to Pavlov.
"...But, the problem of anthropomorphism is one that has for nearly
a century vexed scientists interested in animal behavior. No less than the
Nobel laureate Ivan P. Pavlov once adopted an anthropomorphic approach to
understanding the conditioned reflexes that he and his co-workers discovered
in their studies of canine digestion..."
"In the 1928 book chronicling his first 25 years of conditioning
research, "Lectures on conditioned reflexes," Pavlov describes
this fascinating story as involving two opposite paths to comprehending
conditioned reflexes: the anthropomorphic approach and the scientific
approach."
"According to the anthropomorphic approach, we should be mainly
interested in the internal or subjective world of the dog rather than in its
overt actions. This anthropomorphic approach assumes that the internal world
of the dog--its thoughts, its feelings, its desires (if it has any)--are
analogous to ours. Pavlov and his colleagues actually entertained this
approach prior to 1903 in order to understand the then-called
"psychical" secretions of their dogs to signals for food..."
"...This interpretive breakdown forced the researchers to abandon
what Pavlov suspected was an inborn inclination for people to adopt an
anthropomorphic interpretation and to promote a less familiar, but more
productive objective approach. This analytical transition from
anthropomorphic interpretation to a natural science approach was not an easy
one to make; indeed, Pavlov described the process as involving persistent
deliberation and considerable mental conflict..."
"Jennings' appeal for us to limit our consideration of both human
and animal behavior to objective factors underscores the key imperative of
behaviorism: to explain behavior in terms of matter and energy, thereby
rendering unnecessary any psychical or mental implications. Mentalism was to
play no part in this new behavioral science of the 20th century, a science
which remains prominent to this day."
"Nevertheless, mentalism has staged a surprising comeback in the
form of `cognitive ethology,' a field founded by the biologist Donald R.
Griffin. The goal of cognitive ethology is `to learn as much as possible
about the likelihood that nonhuman animals have mental experiences, and
insofar as these do occur, what they entail and how they affect the animals'
behavior, welfare, and biological fitness' (Griffin, 1978, p. 528). To
Pavlov, Jennings, and Watson, this goal of studying animal consciousness
falls outside the scope of a scientific psychology that has struggled for a
century to avoid such analyses of subjective experience."
"This contest between subjective and objective analyses of behavior
is obviously an important one that has yet to be decided. The second century
of behaviorism will have to prove to its many opponents that a natural
science account of animal behavior and intelligence eclipses subjective and
mentalistic interpretations."
"One area where this contest will surely be waged is the study of
more advanced forms of animal cognition, like memory and conceptualization.
It might be easy to dismiss salivary conditioning as a mindless form of
association formation and to grant behaviorists this narrow realm of
behavioral adaptation. But, it is not going to be so easy to dismiss an
objective analysis of abstract conceptual behavior. The battle is joined.
The resolution will have important implications for our conceptions of
animal and human behavior."
An Awakening
In an attempt to gather support for whatever point of view we might have
held, we looked to science, psychology even religion. Through this process
we have gained but we have also lost. We have gained in the sense that we
have been able to construct certain learning models but in the process we
began to see the dog in two dimensions only and we have lost sight of the
fact that maybe dogs have a higher purpose.
Looking back at my earliest memories of dogs, I find myself full of
wonder and joy. Here were creatures we could commune with, play with, at
times would protect us and who seemed to understand what we were about. The
dogs worked beside us, hunted with us, and played freely. We knew nothing of
anthropomorphism, reinforcement schedules, Premack principles, Thorndike
laws etc.
After I began training, I wanted to learn as much as I could and began
studying the "science" of training. I learned that we shouldn't
ascribe "human" qualities to dogs. I learned that dogs are the
ultimate opportunists and are only interested in "what's in it for
them." I learned dogs have no desire to please, can't develop a sense
of responsibility, are amoral lemon brains, and certainly have no higher
purpose beyond survival. I am really sorry I journeyed so far down this road
before I realized that the sick feeling I had in the pit of my stomach was
my reaction to the broad brush with which we were painting our "best
friend." What I may have gained in the techniques of training, I more
than lost in the spirit of training. Behaviourism is very two
dimensional and doesn't recognize its own limits but tends to place limits
where there should be none, if it's not measurable on our instruments - it
doesn't exist; if it can't be reproduced in the lab - it's not valid;
biology is the only valid motivation - spirituality is not.
Adopting a "scientomorphic" attitude (a term used by Vicki
Hearn) we run the risk of losing sight of the dog. Science would, I believe,
have us view dogs in only a very primitive state (only as biological
specimens). I believe dogs are capable of developing a basic moral sense,
can show altruistic motives and can enjoy meaningful relationships. I
believe these factors are also important in understanding motivations behind
certain behaviors.
When it comes to training, I believe we are responsible to teach the
desired behaviour BUT once it is learned we can hold the dog responsible and
ultimately I believe the dog can develop their own internal sense of
responsibility. You see, I also believe dogs have a sense of dignity and can
take pride in getting the job done properly.
Roger Hild
Port Hope, Ontario
http://www.tsurodogtraining.com/
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